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The Marketplace Metaphor and
Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Or How I Learned to Stop Worrying
About and Love Citizens United
by DARREL C. MENTHE*
Introduction
Modern commercial speech doctrine was laid down in the late
1970s by the Supreme Court in the seminal Virginia Board' and
Central Hudson2 decisions. Central Hudson provides a form of
intermediate scrutiny for content-based regulation of commercial
speech, whereas higher scrutiny is normally required for content-
based regulation of noncommercial speech.' In 1976, when the
Supreme Court first announced protection for commercial speech,
the question of the hour was: Why should commercial speech be
* Stanford Law School J.D. 1996. I would like to thank the staff at the Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly for a swift but thorough review that has substantially
improved this piece.
1. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
2. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557 (1980). The Central Hudson "intermediate scrutiny" test has four prongs, as follows:
(1) to receive any First Amendment protection, commercial speech must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading; (2) the asserted governmental interest to be served by the
restriction on commercial speech must be substantial; (3) the regulation must directly
advance the governmental interest asserted; and (4) the regulation must not be more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566.
3. Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). The government bears a heavy burden to demonstrate a
compelling justification and the lack of any less restrictive alternative. United States v.
Playboy Entm't. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814, 816 (2000).
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entitled to any First Amendment4 protection at all? In response, the
Virginia Board decision echoed Justice Brandeis's dictum that the
remedy for bad speech "is more speech, not enforced silence."'
Today, across the chasm of four decades, commercial speech doctrine
is almost universally approached from the opposite vantage point:
Why should commercial speech receive less than the full protection
accorded to other speech under the First Amendment?
The answer to this question is probably best answered thus: We
don't know anymore. The law is accordingly in flux. While the
formal framework of intermediate scrutiny remains untouched, many
have observed that the practical level of judicial scrutiny appears to
be rising.6 There is growing recognition in the academic community
that commercial speech doctrine is untenable. Some, such as Eugene
Volokh, would not look to strict scrutiny as traditionally formulated,
but would increase protection for commercial speech by barring
content-based regulation of any kind.! Others argue that Central
Hudson might be maintained, but that its lower standard for
commercial speech regulation should be applied only when
specifically connectable to the reason for constitutional disfavor of
the category.'
In a larger sense, however, Central Hudson has never been
satisfying. Central Hudson followed O'Brien9 in using an
intermediate scrutiny test, although the O'Brien test was laid down in
quite a different situation concerning the constitutional treatment of a
speech/conduct hybrid rather than "pure" speech. o An unsigned 2007
Note in the Harvard Law Review perhaps best sums up the present
state of commercial speech doctrine, calling it "a doctrine in search of
a theoretical justification."" Nobody really understands how to
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
6. See Note, Making Sense of Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech
and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2836, 2853-54 (2005); Ashutosh Bhagwat,
The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence,
2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 789 (2007).
7. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending
Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996).
8. Charles Fischette, A New Architecture of Commercial Speech Law, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 663, 665 (2008).
9. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
10. Id. at 377.
11. Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1894 (2007).
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reconcile commercial speech doctrine with the rest of First
Amendment jurisprudence. This article argues that commercial
speech doctrine is the last vigorous remnant of the attempt in the
mid-twentieth century to incorporate a hierarchy of values into the
First Amendment. 2 It is also the last serious remnant of a categorical
approach to First Amendment law developed in that period, an
approach that is now less favored than balancing tests." In short,
commercial speech doctrine is now very much out of step with the
rest of First Amendment law.
That is the good news about Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission.14 Citizens United radically affirmed the principle that
the First Amendment must be neutral as between different speakers,
holding that even corporate speech (at least on political matters) is
fully protected by the First Amendment and cannot be subject to
increased regulation merely because of its corporate authorship."
Although directed at political speech, Citizens United has broad
implications for commercial speech doctrine. It means that the basis
for treating commercial speech differently must be its content, not its
corporate authorship. 6 Above all, the Court made clear that it takes
seriously that the First Amendment is meant to safeguard the
"marketplace of ideas" with all its "free market" connotations." The
Court also rejected as a basis for legislation the notion that the
government should address the market power of large corporations
within the "marketplace of ideas." 8 This article argues that Citizens
United will necessarily lead to the abandonment of commercial
speech doctrine as formulated in Central Hudson.
12. For a description and critique of this development, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Free
Speech in the Twenty-First Century: Ten Lessons from the Twentieth Century, 36 PEPP. L.
REV. 273, 279-81 (2009), and Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and
Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV 375, 387-90 (2009) (describing that
categories were established based on their distance from "core value" of the First
Amendment). A classic statement of commercial speech on the values hierarchy at a time
when that description was in little dispute comes from Martin H. Redish, The Value of
Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593-94 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767,
779-80 (2001) Modern cases generally contain language about balancing and burdens on
speech, not categories of favored or disfavored speech.
14. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
15. Id. at 913.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 904-07, 914.
18. Id. at 899.
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Whatever else can be said about Citizens United, this result will
be a good thing. The damage caused by commercial speech doctrine
is not small. Central Hudson has resulted in protection for an
astonishing array of speech regulations, in particular regulations on
signage, that threatens to confine the First Amendment to the public
square and confine it further within that square. The requirement of
permits is such a norm in the world of commercial speech that it has, I
would argue, contributed to the erosion of the protections against
prior restraint for other forms of speech.
To understand the danger to be avoided, it is worth considering
Vincent Blasi's "pathological perspective" on the First Amendment,
viewing it as uniquely vulnerable among the rights secured by the
Constitution." Like ripping off a Band-Aid, the sooner that the
Supreme Court follows up on the implications of Citizens United and
moves toward full First Amendment protections for commercial
speech, the easier it will be to contain the damage.
If we are going to prevent reinfection, however, then we need to
understand more than just the doctrinal isolation of Central Hudson,
but the policies that have supported commercial speech doctrine for
so long.20 I propose that the longevity of commercial speech doctrine
is because it supports-albeit crudely-a set of popular policy goals
concerning the restriction of commercial advertising, in particular
constraints on false advertising and the location of billboards. 2, Part
of the task of abolishing commercial speech doctrine will be locating a
new constitutional framework for these policy goals without tacking
19. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985).
20. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The
Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123,130 (1996) ("If commercial speech
protection has had its supporters from left and right, it has likewise had bipartisan critics.
The critics have found such protection difficult to square with standard theories justifying
special protection of speech from majoritarian politics. Strikingly, however, none of these
critiques seems to have moved the Court since Virginia Board. While Virginia Board
maintained some distinctions between commercial and other protected speech, it and later
cases expressly rejected the global arguments of its critics."); Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1778-84 (2004) (discussing how the expected "collision" between
the First Amendment and various forms of corporate speech in terms of securities and
antitrust activities never took place).
21. This is not entirely a new idea. See Samuel A. Terilli, Nike v. Kasky and the
Running-But-Going-Nowhere Commercial Speech Debate, 10 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 383, 425
(2005) ("At the heart of the matter is the concern that without it government will be
unable to regulate constitutionally certain forms of conduct, from transactions to
advertisements for harmful or illegal products.").
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footnotes onto the First Amendment. Then we can make a little
lemonade out of Citizens United.
Part I of this article explains the emergence of commercial
speech doctrine and how it has become a constitutional and doctrinal
anomaly. The doctrine emerged out of a theory of the First
Amendment that considered values to be deeply embedded within
the First Amendment. Today, the Court has adopted the metaphor
of a "marketplace of ideas" to describe a government and a
constitution that is, by contrast, neutral between other values.
Part II explains the justifications traditionally given for
commercial speech doctrine, and why those justifications no longer
support the maintenance of that doctrine today without the explicit
endorsement and constitutionalization of the values from which they
are derived.
Finally, Part III argues that Citizens United, by embracing the
notion that the First Amendment's primary purpose is to protect the
"marketplace of ideas," must necessarily lead to the end of a separate
commercial speech doctrine. This article argues that this
development should be embraced because the existence of what is
now largely just an "exception" to the First Amendment for
commercial speech regulation is proving hazardous to the purposes
and values embedded in the First Amendment. Commercial speech
doctrine has already led to a very high level of speech regulation-
much higher than most commentators acknowledge.22 The better
path is to pursue these policy goals concerning advertising and
billboards under more traditional police power doctrines, with
whatever limitations result, without trying to shoehorn them into a
doctrine that functions as an erratum to the First Amendment. Doing
so would be refreshing in an area of law increasingly beset by
intellectual dishonesty, and also safeguard the bedrock principle of
free speech for years to come.
22. David Vladeck, for example, has argued that the Central Hudson "results in the
virtually automatic invalidation of laws restraining truthful commercial speech." David C.
Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1049, 1059 (2004). This conclusion is belied by the breadth of outdoor advertising
regulations that usually pass beneath the academic radar. This phenomenon is probably
related to the general tendency of pedagogic literature on the First Amendment to
marginalize the regulation of mass or electronic media. For a useful discussion of this
subject, see generally Marvin Ammori, Another Worthy Tradition: How the Free Speech
Curriculum Ignores Electronic Media and Distorts Free Speech Doctrine, 70 MO. L. REV.
59 (2005). Ammori explains that because First Amendment law is primarily taught as it
concerns the regulation of speech in a public forum, regulation of speech on private
property is underexplored.
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I. The Origin and Anomaly of Commercial Speech Doctrine
A. The Road Not Taken: The Public Purpose View of the First
Amendment and the First Amendment as Community Right
Commercial speech doctrine can be viewed as a relict dogma that
emerged out of a profoundly liberal, mid-twentieth-century vision of
the First Amendment. As will be seen, this vision, particularly as
expounded by Alexander Meiklejohn and his contemporaries, was
dominant for a time, but now its impact is fading except with respect
to a few areas, including notably commercial speech.
As originally articulated, Meiklejohn's vision of the First
Amendment proceeds from the notion that: "The First Amendment
does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of
those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern.'
It is concerned, not with a private right, but with a public power, a
governmental responsibility." 23  Thus, Meiklejohn ties the First
Amendment explicitly to the maintenance of political liberty and
"self-government."24 The articulation that the First Amendment is
not concerned with a "private right" is almost stunning to modern
ears.
The Supreme Court in Citizens United has dramatically
confirmed that there is no longer any majority that will endorse a
public-purpose interpretation of the First Amendment. While the
Court in Citizens United confirms the importance of political speech
to democracy,25 it rejects the idea that regulation may be enacted to
ward off the "distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth,"26
even if arguably the excessive wealth of a few interferes with self-
government.
In fact, the 2009 and 2010 decisions that recognized an individual
right to possess firearms in the Second Amendment indicate how
much the notion of "individual rights" rather than a public-purpose
interpretation dominates the modern Court's view of the entire Bill of
Rights.27
23. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255 (1961).
24. Id.
25. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 891 (2010).
26. Id. at 906.
27. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia v.
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). The First Amendment, after all, does not explicitly invoke
a public purpose the way the Second Amendment does, with its preface ("A well
regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state."). Meiklejohn might have
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In its time, however, Meiklejohn's view helped foster the
elaboration of a hierarchy of values into the First Amendment, which
was widely embraced." These values became, I would argue, the
bones of modern First Amendment jurisprudence. At the top of the
speech hierarchy was political speech, at the bottom, unprotected at
all, were obscenity and "fighting words."29 Commercial speech would
fall somewhere in the middle. When the Court in Roth held that
obscenity was that which lacked any "redeeming social importance,""
this comment can best be understood in light of the elaboration of a
public purpose of the First Amendment.
In the public-purpose view, commercial speech doctrine makes
doctrinal sense. Indeed, the public-purpose view explains why strict
scrutiny is not appropriate. The easy extension of full First
Amendment protection to corporate advertising disquiets. It seems
to ennoble hucksters, cheapen political discourse, or both. Central
Hudson acknowledged these fears.
Most notable, however, is how unfriendly the public-purpose
view of the First Amendment is to the metaphor of a "marketplace of
ideas." The marketplace metaphor is a particular gloss on the notion
of the "negative theory" of the First Amendment. 32 The idea that the
primary purpose of the First Amendment is to preclude government
interference in the "marketplace of ideas" does not animate in the
public-purpose view.
Moreover, the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor reflects
precisely the laissez-faire ideology that mid-twentieth-century
wished for a preamble that stated "Freedom of conscience being necessary to republican
government, the right of free speech . . . shall not be infringed." If even the Second
Amendment, with such a preamble, does not have a public purpose interpretation
anymore, it is not surprising that such an interpretation is failing with respect to the First
Amendment also.
28. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
29. Meiklejohn himself actually decried a government's decision to judge certain
novels obscene as a constitutional deprivation, because he found literature and the arts to
be inherently of social importance, which he called a "governing" importance.
Meiklejohn, supra note 23. However, this is best seen as solicitude for art, not obscenity.
30. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
31. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980) ("As we stated in Ohralik, the failure to distinguish between commercial
and noncommercial speech 'could invite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force
of the [First] Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech."' (quoting
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).
32. See Blake D. Morant, Electoral Integrity: Media, Democracy, and the Value of
Self-Restraint, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26-28 (2003) and accompanying notes.
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liberalism eschewed. Having rejected hands-off economics in the
New Deal as a practical and theoretical failure, mid-twentieth-century
liberalism found no special appeal in the notion of a
"free"(unregulated) market of ideas.33 As Meiklejohn aptly stated, "I
have never been able to share the Miltonian faith that in a fair fight
between truth and error, truth is sure to win. And if one had that
faith, it would be hard to reconcile it with the sheer stupidity of the
policies of this nation-and of other nations-now driving humanity
to the very edge of final destruction."
In the public-purpose view, then, the aim of the First
Amendment is not to allow cacophony, wherever it might lead, but to
promote the education, learning, and organized exchange of ideas
that would lead to better-informed citizenry and, through that, better
public policy. If this view seems somewhat elitist today, it did not
seem so fifty years ago. The Great Depression had discredited, in the
eyes of its contemporaries, the reigning ideology of
noninterventionist government in the market and, by extension, in
the public square.35 When compared to the ideologies of communism
or fascism with which it competed, Meiklejohn's vision of the First
Amendment and democratic self-governance was liberty breathing
free.
This public-purpose view of the First Amendment can be seen in
the early formulations of the "fairness doctrine" of the FCC that
required opposing views be given airtime.36 As the D.C. Circuit
explained:
Countervailing power on the opposite sides of many issues of
public concern often neutralizes this defect. In many other
cases, the courts must act as if such an inherent balancing
mechanism were at work in order to avoid either weighing the
worth of conflicting views or emasculating the robust debate
they seek to promote. If the fairness doctrine cannot withstand
First Amendment scrutiny, the reason is that to insure a
balanced presentation of controversial issues may be to insure
no presentation, or no vigorous presentation, at all. But where,
as here, one party to a debate has a financial clout and a
compelling economic interest in the presentation of one side
33. G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free
Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299, 345-50 (1996).
34. Meiklejohn, supra note 23, at 263.
35. See Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between Morality and Law in
Modern Legal Thought, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 784, 802 (1989).
36. See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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unmatched by its opponent, and where the public stake in the
argument is no less than life itself-we think the purpose of
rugged debate is served, not hindered, by an attempt to redress
the balance.
Reading the original public-purpose texts of the early twenty-
first century, a reader can be forgiven for mild nausea at the tendency
for naive paternalism. Such visceral reactions are a certain indication
that something fundamental has changed in the zeitgeist.
As can be seen, then, commercial speech doctrine emerged with
Meiklejohn's "public purpose" view of the First Amendment in that it
derives from the "hierarchy of values" that was incorporated by that
view into the First Amendment. Under Virginia Board, the primary
reason for according less protection to commercial speech is that it is
less valuable than political speech, but not entirely without value."
As the Court put it, "Our question is whether speech which does 'no
more than propose a commercial transaction,' is so removed from any
'exposition of ideas,' and from 'truth, science, morality, and arts in
general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the administration of
Government,' that it lacks all protection. Our answer is that it is
not."
Such a judgment is possible to make when the First Amendment
is viewed as representing a set of embedded values. When the First
Amendment is viewed instead as officially neutral between various
competing values, the honoring of any particular set of values may be
viewed as tantamount to forbidden viewpoint discrimination.
For example, in Virginia Board, Justice Blackmun's opinion for
the Court does not articulate the "intermediate scrutiny" test that
emerged four years later in Central Hudson, but lists the permissible
regulations that set the stage for the articulation of a lower test for
37. Id. at 1103.
38. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
39. Id. For an explication of the argument in short order, see Elena Kagan, Private
Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine,
63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 476 ("An audience-based perspective does better in accounting for
First Amendment doctrine's categorization of speech according to value. If the goal of a
free speech system is to provide individuals (especially in their roles as citizens) with the
range of opinion and information that will enable them to arrive at truth and make wise
decisions, then a tiered system of speech, of the kind the Court has created, seems
appropriate. Some speech does not enrich (may even impoverish) the sphere of public
discourse. Other speech contributes to reasoned deliberation on matters of public import.
Under the audience-based approach, it would be perverse to treat these disparate forms of
speech identically. Thus emerges a multitiered system.").
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noncommercial speech." In Virginia Board, citizens who wished to
obtain price information about prescription drugs brought suit against
the state board that prohibited pharmacists from publishing price
information.41 The crucial line in the opinion is the observation that
most people think of price information as important-probably more
important to a great many than political ideas-and they have a right
to receive this information.42 Justices Stewart (concurring) and
Rehnquist (dissenting) objected to the "elevation" 43 of commercial
speech or to a formulation that would protect it as strongly with
"ideological" expression that "is integrally related to the exposition of
thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man.""
This category-based approach to the First Amendment, based on
the relative value of different kinds of speech, had its apogee under
the Burger court.45 However, the categorical approach to the First
Amendment has increasingly given way to balancing tests. 46 In these
balancing tests, the underlying values must be made explicit and, if
possible, tethered to some objective state interest. The result for First
Amendment law is doctrinal inconsistency. As Eric Freedman put it
memorably:
Current free speech law resembles the Ptolemaic system of
astronomy in its last days. Just as that theory grew increasingly
incoherent in an attempt to incorporate new empirical
observations that were inconsistent with its basic postulates, so
is First Amendment doctrine disintegrating as cases reviewing
restraints on speech strive to paper over the fact that analyses
based on presuppositions as to the value of particular kinds of
40. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 770; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
41. Virginia Board, 425 U.S. at 771-72.
42. Id. at 763-64.
43. Id. at 781 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 780 (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. For a description and critique of this development, see Stone, supra note 12, at
279-81, and Blocher, supra note 12, at 387-90 (describing that categories were established
based on their distance from "core value" of the First Amendment). A classic statement
of commercial speech on the values hierarchy at a time when that description was in little
dispute comes from Redish, supra note 12, at 593-94.
46. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 779-80 (discussing how modern cases
generally contain language about balancing and burdens on speech, not categories of
favored or disfavored speech).
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expression are inconsistent with the premises of the First
Amendment itself.47
It is worth noting, of course, that Ptolemy was no fool. While his
system is an object of derision today, to him and to a dozen
generations of scholars thereafter, the Ptolemaic system not only
made sense, but meaningfully expressed dearly held beliefs about the
nature of the world and of humankind's place within it. Scientific
revolution requires more than just new observations-it requires a
new mindset and a willingness to abandon values. Legal revolutions
appear to be no different.
The decline of categorization has now been well documented."
Commercial speech doctrine, however, is a survivor. Contrast
commercial speech doctrine's longevity to the fate of the "fighting
words" category of speech announced in Chaplinsky.49  R.A. V.
restricted the reach of the "fighting words" doctrine, with its
protection of such incendiary speech.' But the change is even
greater: Insulting a police officer today will get you invited to the
White House for a beer.5'
B. The Road We Know: The First Amendment and the Marketplace of
Ideas
In the generation after Meiklejohn, Martin Reddish declared
that the purpose of the First Amendment is "individual self-
realization."5 ' A flood of commentary since then about other values
served by the First Amendment has never done much to displace the
47. Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus When You Remove the Lens
Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Particularly Urgent
for the Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of Speech and
Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 883, 885 (1996).
48. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 13, at 779-80; Blocher, supra note 12, at 387-90.
49. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
50. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380-81 (1992).
51. Of course, there was more involved in Professor Gates's arrest, release, and
subsequent "beer summit" at the White House than Gates's words. But, like Mr.
Chaplinsky, there was a subtext that the arrest took place because the speaker belonged to
a marginalized group (African-Americans or Jehovah's Witnesses). And it seems certain
that the words uttered by Mr. Chaplinsky ("You are a God damned racketeer and a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists." Chaplinsky, 315
U.S. at 569.) were more genteel than those of Professor Gates. "Fascist" is scarcely the
worst "F-word" in common parlance today.
52. Reddish, supra note 12, at 593-94.
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word from this formulation, or to diminish its weight and importance
in our constitutional system.
Where the goal of the First Amendment is "individual self-
realization," rather than "self-government," the focus shifts to the
individual and away from the community. Yet, by itself, such a shift
in First Amendment discourse might not require any change in
commercial speech doctrine. Protection of commercial speech does
not, after all, appear to be connected to individual self-realization in
any direct or meaningful way. As Edwin Baker argued in 1976,
commercial speech can be heavily regulated precisely because it lacks
the "crucial connection" to self-realization." Thomas Jackson and
John Calvin Jeffries argued in the same time period that the First
Amendment is about protecting certain identifiable values, both self-
government and the opportunity for individual self-expression;54 thus,
commercial speech was not included within its ambit.
While courts never openly embraced "self-realization" as a
fundamental First Amendment principle, courts nonetheless did come
to endorse an individual-rights view of the First Amendment. As
Justice Brennan lamented in 1979 when the court began to disavow
the "public purpose" view:
Although the various senses in which the First Amendment
serves democratic values will in different contexts demand
distinct emphasis and development, they share the common
characteristic of being instrumental to the attainment of social
ends. It is a great mistake to understand this aspect of the First
Amendment solely through the filter of individual rights."
As noted above, a pure individual-rights filter has now spread to
the Second Amendment as well.
Above all, the triumphant metaphor has been the "marketplace
of ideas," with the First Amendment enshrining an intellectual
laissez-faire-the principle of government nonintervention. It is hard
to overestimate the power of this fundamentally libertarian metaphor
in our constitutional life." There can be little doubt that this market
53. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976).
54. Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic
Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979).
55. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 187 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. Ironically, the marketplace metaphor was introduced to the modem court by
Justice Brennan himself, but in a context suggesting market failure. "I think the right to
[Vol. 38:1142
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metaphor welcomes commercial speech into the First Amendment's
fold. The California Supreme Court in its Gerawan opinion
explained such a view in caustic tones."
The triumph of the marketplace metaphor is something of a
political and judicial miracle. It is true that a strain of political
discourse going back to the founding generation envisioned a republic
of proud freeholders, beholden to no one, paying taxes only for the
defense of their lives and property. But if that mythic republic ever
existed, it is long since gone, both in practice and even from much of
the public imagination. The typical homeowner is not a farmer or
freeholder. She likely lives on an eighth of an acre, heavily
mortgaged to a bank, often in a housing development shorn by its
corporate developer of its air, water, and mineral rights, on which she
can neither dig nor build without a multiplicity of permits and
inspections. The citizen is, in fact, as likely to rent as to own his or
her dwelling, and almost certainly derives the income to pay the bank
or landlord by working for someone else, not from the use of the
property. In short, we are a nation of renters, debtors, and
employees, not freeholders.
It is not surprising, then, that our political discourse no longer
deeply connects the meaning of freedom with possessing private
property, particularly real estate. For most of us, freedom means
much more than noninterference with property rights. The words of
Justice Kennedy come closer to the mark when he wrote that, "[a]t
the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
receive publications is such a fundamental right. The dissemination of ideas can
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and consider
them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buyers."
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965); see also David Cole, Agon at Agora:
Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 894 (1986)
("Though it is often made to do so, Brennan's metaphor need not carry the baggage of
economic theory that Holmes expressly adopted. The marketplace of ideas, in Brennan's
figuration, conjures up the Greek 'agora,' the central meeting place for exchange.").
57. Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal. 4th 468, 487, 497 (2000).
58. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP IN
THE SECOND QUARTER 2010, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/
hvs/qtr2l0/files/q2l0press.pdf (showing 69.9% homeownership rate nationwide for 2010);
see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORTGAGE STATUS AND SELECTED MONTHLY OWNER
COSTS - UNIVERSE: OWNER-OCCUP1ED HOUSING UNITS (2008), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff (hover over "Data Sets"; then click on "American
Community Survey"; then click on "Detailed Tables" with "2006-2008 American
Community Survey 3-Year Estimates" highlighted; then click on "Show Result") (showing
that 51 million owner-occupied housing units of the nation's 75 million total owner-
occupied housing units are mortgaged).
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existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.""
Yet that thread of nineteenth century thought that gave us the
"marketplace" metaphor won out in the end in the First Amendment,
or at least has now become dominant and is inscribing itself ever
deeper on our law. The earliest mention of the "marketplace"
metaphor in the Supreme Court appears in a typically blistering
dissent by Justice Holmes in 1919 from Abrams v. United States,
where the Supreme Court upheld a wartime espionage conviction for
distributing leaflets with "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language
about the form of Government of the United States."" Justice
Holmes wrote:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.
That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.6 1
The "free market" ideology was resurrected in the 1970s with the
"Chicago School." Presently, the evidence is that the judiciary is now
in terminal embrace with those ideas. The phrase "marketplace of
ideas" has been used in several dozen Supreme Court opinions after
the 1970s, appearing now in almost every First Amendment Case.62
Today, usage of the "marketplace" metaphor is not only dominant in
59. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Another sweeping expression of the same, connecting it with the First Amendment, was
articulated in indicating the limitations of Meiklejohn's views of liberty. "If 'we the
people' are to be sovereigns, in any sense of the word, the government must be bound to
respect the dignity and right of every citizen to rule over his or her own life." John F.
Wirenius, Giving the Devil the Benefit of Law: Pornographers, the Feminist Attack on Free
Speech, and the First Amendment, 20 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 67 (1993).
60. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919).
61. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62. Since the millennium, it has appeared almost every term. See Pleasant Grove City
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1131 (2009); Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 128 S. Ct. 2759,
2781 (2008); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208 (2008);
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007); Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S.
230, 280 (2006); McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005); Clingman v.
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 621 (2005); Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 575
(2005); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 336 (2003); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119
(2003); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 553 (2001).
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the Supreme Court since the 1970s, it is frequently cited without any
*63
examination.
The particular expression of the "marketplace of ideas" by
Ronald Coase has turned out to be dominant and prescient.' Coase
made the connection to commercial speech at the outset. Coase
asked why, if we trusted truth to win out in the marketplace of ideas
(political speech), did we not similarly expect truth to win out in the
marketplace of goods (commercial speech)? 5 He argued that it made
little sense to regulate information about the goods more heavily than
information about political ideas when, if anything, "buying harmful
ideas is just as bad as buying harmful drugs."" Coase's argument, and
the metaphor it relies upon, has become the primary reason why
commercial speech doctrine is under threat today. To counter those
who argued that unrestricted, unregulated advertising, even
misleading advertising, would distort the marketplace for goods,
Coase responded that consumer tastes are determined by so many
factors that advertising is unlikely to change tastes much.67 The logic
of these ideas presses hard for the abolition of commercial speech
doctrine as we know it.6
Even those who eschew a market metaphor today nonetheless
accept the centrality to the First Amendment of the metaphor's
explicit conclusion that the government must not interfere in the
development and propagation of ideas, and the implicit assumption
that noninterference will produce a superior result. For example,
Solicitor General Elena Kagan wrote in 1996 that, in her analysis, the
use of speech categories in First Amendment law (which I attribute
here to an earlier strain of liberalism) is really an elaborate structure
whose effect, if not necessarily by design, is to suss out "improper
motives" behind regulation.69 She argued that if the Court's focus
could be directed at improper motive, it "could remove the lion's
63. W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of Ideas, 73
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40,40-44 (1996).
64. R. H. Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7 (1977).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 9-11.
68. Richard Posner, another leading Chicago School light, surprisingly, once took the
opposite view on commercial speech: if you can regulate the product, you can regulate the
advertisement. Also, "the most dangerous monopoly is a monopoly on political power."
Richard Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 9, 40
(1986).
69. See generally Kagan, supra note 39.
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share of the First Amendment's doctrinal clutter."o Kagan's analysis
presumes that the government should be neutral to all speech,
equating interference with impropriety. "[T]he principle of
impartiality applies not only to persons, but to ideas. In determining
whether to restrict speech, the government may not rank the worth or
"rightness" of messages; to do so would be to register a kind of
disrespect that automatically renders the action improper."" In short,
the marketplace metaphor with its neoconservative economic
connotations is now dominant in the Court's First Amendment
decisions.
C. Only Mostly Dead: An Attempt to Save Commercial Speech Doctrine
The public-purpose view of the First Amendment remained a
mainstay in First Amendment discourse for a long time. It remains
an academic strain of discourse, which now holds that commercial
speech doctrine serves the First Amendment because of the perceived
need to regulate the allegedly outsized speaking power of large
corporate enterprises; it equates corporate speech with commercial
speech.72 The modern public-purpose view of the First Amendment
also involves a deliberate reaction to the "marketplace of ideas"
metaphor: It posits that government should seek to remedy the
pervasive "market failure" caused by the power of big corporations to
drown out smaller or individual speech. There seem to be no
shortage of new justifications from this left-perspective for excluding
commercial speech from the full protection of the First Amendment."
70. Id. at 414, 515.
71. Id. at 511-12.
72. See, e.g., Ronald Collins, et al., Corporations and Commercial Speech, 30
SEATrLE U. L. REv. 895, 916-20 (2007) (discussing the commercial speech issue in Nike as
a corporate speech issue); Michael R. Siebecker, Building a "New Institutional" Approach
to Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247 (2008); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 867 (2008) (discussing commercial speech as
primarily about institutional speech). Cf Gary M. Bishop, Corporate Speech and the Right
of Response in the Commercial Free Zone, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1149, 1154-55 (2008)
(arguing that corporate speech is more than just commercial speech, and vice versa).
73. See, e.g., Tamara L. Piety, Market Failure in the Marketplace of Ideas:
Commercial Speech and the Problem that Won't Go Away, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 181, 185
(2007); Reza R. Dibadj, The Political Economy of Commercial Speech, 58 S.C. L. REV. 913
(2007) (discussing how protection for commercial speech is a clever corporate attempt to
make an end run around deference to administrative agencies, which is part of a corporate
deregulatory agenda); Amit Schejter, Jacob's Voice, Esau's Hands: Transparency as a First
Amendment Right in an Age of Deceit and Impersonation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1489
(2007) (arguing for a First Amendment right of "transparency" as an antidote to
advertisements); Desiree A. Kennedy, Marketing Goods, Marketing Images: The Impact of
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These discussions invoke the power of corporate money and the
evils of advertising. These arguments are not altogether new in
academic discourse,74 but what seems new is the explicit response to a
"marketplace" metaphor.
At bottom, however, this public-purpose view of the First
Amendment seems motivated by antipathy to the corporate speaker.
Although some wish to devalue corporate speech specifically because
of the corporate identity of the speaker," this view did not, in fact,
animate commercial speech doctrine as it emerged in the 1970s. And
still, as currently formulated, commercial speech doctrine is defined
by content, and only incidentally determined by the speaker.
Exceptions are rare, but telling. In Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v.
Amersham Health, Inc. for example, the district court held that
scientific reports are non-commercial speech, but the same reports
republished in an advertisement constitute commercial speech.76
Advocates of a new basis for existing commercial speech
doctrine note that a corporation has few if any of the attributes of
personhood that would be connected to having a right of free
expression. For example, Tom Bennigson argues that if corporations
have no interest in their own free speech and if corporate speech is
not the speech of any person, then the reasons for protecting
corporate speech must have to do with protecting the interests, if any,
of the listeners in receiving it." "Because corporate speech vindicates
Advertising on Race, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 615 (2000) (arguing that First Amendment
protection for commercial speech disadvantages certain groups as it is excessively
individualistic); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 194-224
(Oxford Univ. Press 1992) (1989); Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L.
REV. 735, 735-36 (1995) (arguing that speech without an identifiable individual author is
ineligible for First Amendment protection); Vladeck, supra note 22, at 1059; Daniel J. H.
Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995,
1062 (1998) (arguing that free speech rights should be reserved for natural persons, not
corporations, because corporate speech distorts the political process).
74. See, e.g., George K. Gardner, Note, The Massachusetts Billboard Decision, 49
HARV. L. REV. 869, 902 (1936) (suggesting that billboard advertising is an attempt to
subvert individual human beings to the service of manufacturing interest).
75. Some of the broadest statements by Edwin Baker. E.g., Edwin Baker, First
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 902 (2002) ("Freedom to act
(e.g., to speak) and to alienate (e.g., to provide another with your communication) are
direct aspects of personal liberty. In contrast, market transactions are exercises of power
over other people."). See also Tamara R. Piety, Why the ACLU Was Wrong About Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 41 TULSA L. REV. 715 (2006).
76. Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Amersham Health, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D.N.J.
2009).
77. Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech?, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 379, 448 (2006).
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no one's expressive interests, restrictions can in principle be justified
by showing that listener interests will be benefited more than they
will be harmed."78
This analysis has much to recommend it. First, the First
Amendment can be considered in the context of human rights, and no
legal theory that values human personhood can take seriously the
attribution of human rights to a fictional corporate person. To the
extent that a First Amendment jurisprudence does crudely make this
equation between human beings and institutions, it is troubling.
Second, treating corporations as persons runs counter to a substantial
body of law that does treat natural and corporate persons differently
based on the obvious fact that corporations are not human beings."
Note that the California Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court in Kasky v. Nike' and Citizens United respectively
agreed that the corporations involved were engaged in political
expression." The courts accepted at face value that the corporation is
the speaker, and also easily conflated a corporation with other
"associations."' But this is a fiction. While endowed with legal
personhood, a corporation is not an actual person with a brain (or
heart); it has no political ideas of its own. The opinions and ideas
expressed are necessarily those of its owners or managers. As Justice
Stevens wrote in dissent, "Like all other natural persons, every
shareholder of every corporation remains entirely free ... to do
however much electioneering she pleases outside of the corporate
form.""
Others argue that corporate law itself provides a sufficient basis
for restraining corporate speech.' The argument from corporate law
observes that a corporation differs from a club or other voluntary
"association" in that it is organized exclusively for the financial
benefit of its stockholders and specially chartered by the state with a
grant of limited liability to the stockholders. Crucially, a stockholder
78. Id.
79. Among the most obvious differences are that corporations cannot vote, serve on
juries, or marry, all of which are fundamental rights guaranteed to natural persons.
80. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 947-48 (2002).
81. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889 (2010).
82. Id. at 900 ("The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First
Amendment simply because such associations are not 'natural persons."').
83. Id. at 943.
84. Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair
Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2005).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:1148
Fall 2010] COMMERCIAL SPEECH AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
has a right to bring an action against a corporation if its managers are
mismanaging it for personal gain, or using corporate resources for
their own private benefit. Such personal use of corporate funds
generally goes by the term "corporate waste.""
If the corporation's owners or managers wish to use corporate
resources to engage in their own political speech, that is a form of
corporate waste. Thus, goes the argument, "corporate" political
speech is a waste of corporate resources, and can be enjoined for that
reason alone.
The formulation is also persuasive in the converse. Corporate
political speech might not be waste if there is a larger commercial
purpose to the speech-i.e., advocating some course of action that
will directly profit the enterprise. This formulation, however, throws
into doubt the holding that corporate expenditures on political
campaigns are ordinary speech, indistinguishable from such
expenditures by natural persons. Natural persons are allowed to
engage in speech for its own sake, but if it is a violation of fiduciary
principles for the corporation's managers to use corporate assets to
promote their own political views, the presumption must be that a
corporation making campaign expenditures has an explicit intention
of receiving a financial benefit. If, to be legal "speech," corporate
political donations must be undertaken with an explicit expectation of
financial reward, then corporate donations to legislators look less like
free speech and a lot more like bribery.'
Similarly, because a corporation's owners are entitled to the
presumption that they are not wasting corporate assets, it makes
sense to presume that any corporate speech has, as its primary
purpose, the pursuit of profit. Tom Bennigson makes the same basic
argument that speech by a for-profit corporation must always be
considered commercial speech.8 The common insight behind many
academic arguments for limiting commercial speech has to do with
what is viewed as the excessive or unbalanced power of corporate
interests in their ability to dominate the "marketplace of ideas" and
drown out other voices. As Jerome Barron argued forty years ago,
"The 'marketplace of ideas' view has rested on the assumption that
85. See Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591 (1933).
86. This is one of the reasons why Buckley v. Valeo and its progeny may have missed
the mark on whether corporate expenditures on political campaigns can be considered
"political speech."
87. Bennigson, supra note 77. See also Alex W. Cannon, Regulating Adwords:
Consumer Protection in a Market Where the Commodity Is Speech, 39 SETON HALL L.
REV. 291, 316 (2009); Greenwood, supra note 73, at 1065.
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protecting the right of expression is equivalent to providing for it.
But changes in the communications industry have destroyed the
equilibrium in that marketplace."m This author has found no court
that has yet endorsed this theory."
Perhaps the most compelling literature in this vein is Eugene
Volokh's groundbreaking 1995 piece where he predicted that "cheap
speech" on the internet and elsewhere will naturally correct
imbalance in the "marketplace of ideas" caused by the ability of
certain wealthy interests to dominate the conversation through
control of media and advertising." In other words, Volokh would
have likely agreed (in 1995 anyway) that any imbalance in
marketplace of ideas in favor of the rich and powerful in was an
artifact of the media boom of the late-twentieth century rather than
an inherent feature of commercial speech that the First Amendment
should correct. The market might prove to be self-regulating after all,
at least with technological development.
Few would argue that Volokh's early vision has been realized, at
least not yet. Fifteen years later, print media is ailing badly, which
may only serve to increase the power of the handful of corporate
networks that are still able to make money off the news. The deus ex
agora9 is still not here.
H. The Limits of Commercial Speech Doctrine
A. The Central Hudson Rationales for Intermediate Scrutiny
Professors Chemerinsky and Fisk offer what could be a classic
defense of the Central Hudson approach of creating a "commercial
speech" category under the First Amendment as articulated today-a
defense that does not aver specifically to the lesser value of
commercial speech.' This is more or less an objective approach,
meaning that it is proposed that commercial speech is given lesser
88. Jerome Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1641, 1647-48 (1967).
89. To the extent this theory was present in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), it was explicitly overruled by Citizens United.
90. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805 passim
(1995).
91. Ashamedly mixing Greek and Latin-the god out of the marketplace-akin to
the deus ex machina, a plot device in which a seemingly impossible situation is abruptly
solved with some contrivance or new character.
92. Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue
Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1160 (2004).
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protection for certain observable or objective reasons, not just
because it is less valued:
Lines are always best drawn with reference to the underlying
purposes to be served. The goal of treating commercial speech
as a distinct category is to allow the government to regulate and
prohibit advertising to protect consumers. From this
perspective, the California Supreme Court got it exactly right:
A company's false statements about its product should be
regarded as commercial speech unprotected by the First
Amendment."
Chemerinsky and Fisk then recite the three specific reasons
given why commercial speech should be a disfavored category under
the First Amendment. First, they argue that the burden to determine
the truth of commercial speech should be with the speaker because of
the speaker's unique knowledge.94 Second, they posit that stricter
regulations on commercial speech are acceptable because commercial
speech is less easily chilled than other forms of speech. Third, they
rely on the widely accepted interest in preventing "commercial
harm,"9 which seems to mean preventing some species of fraud-the
harm to consumers from misleading consumers into spending money
*97
on particular goods or services.
These three classic arguments have never been all that
convincing. As to unique knowledge, the problem is that this is not
really a characteristic of commercial speech or commercial speakers
alone. Almost any speaker, when making claims about himself or
herself, is in the best position to verify those claims. For example, a
politician's promise, and intention of keeping it, is even more
uniquely within his or her province, yet regulation of that speech is
subject to the highest scrutiny." So while unique knowledgemay be a
characteristic of commercial speech, it is not peculiar to commercial
speech, and does not by itself justify diminished treatment for
commercial speech.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1146.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1146-47.
97. These rationales remain at the core of cases following Central Hudson. See, e.g,
Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 955 (2002).
98. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1982).
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Regarding whether commercial speech is less easily "chilled"
than noncommercial speech, this also appears to be mostly a
conjecture. Tom Bennigson argues persuasively that speech
motivated by monetary concerns alone is likely chilled much more
easily than political speech." As he notes, the speaker of "Give me
liberty or give me death!" would seem less likely to be silenced by an
unfriendly regulation than someone who risks busting an advertising
budget with heavy fines.'" Pepsi does not normally inspire
martyrdom. On the other hand, when a person's livelihood depends
on commercial speech (as billboard companies do) they may be very
motivated to break the law.'o' It is, at any rate, hard to make broad
generalizations about the relative motivations of speakers of
commercial or noncommercial speech. Certainly there is little
empirical support offered anywhere for the proposition that
commercial speech is more robust than political speech.
Finally, the need to prevent the harm caused by false or
misleading commercial speech only seems persuasive if we disregard
or discount the harm that we know is caused by other kinds of speech
granted full protection under the First Amendment. After all,
political speech can cause significant harm. Surely, for example, the
Supreme Court has not decided that potential for harm from false
nutritional labeling exceeds that of radical Islamist propaganda.
Indeed, the 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project
endorses the principle that speech alone can be dangerous, amounting
to material support of terrorism."
There are other kinds of harmful speech that we explicitly
permit. So-called "hate speech" can be very harmful to those
subjected to it, but it enjoys First Amendment protection."o3 When
the Supreme Court overturned regulations punishing a burning cross
in R.A. V., it was not suggesting that the burning cross caused less
harm than would a false advertisement that could be more readily
regulated."
99. Bennigson, supra note 77, at 391-92.
100. Id.
101. And they do. See, e.g., Desert Outdoor Adver. v. City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d
814 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct 2705, 2724 (2010).
103. Leonard v. Nix, 55 F.3d 370, 374 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992)).
104. See R. A.V., 505 U.S. at 424.
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Also, we tend to think of decisions about evaluation and
prevention of harm to be within the province of the legislative branch
to decide. It is highly unusual to adopt a doctrine proclaiming that
certain speech is more likely to be harmful than others outside of the
context of upholding a specific statute.
Thus, none of these justifications for commercial speech doctrine
are very persuasive outside of a preexisting assumption that
commercial speech is less valuable than political speech.
Other justifications have been tried that are supposedly content
neutral. For example, David Farber asked thirty years ago "Can
present commercial speech doctrine be justified on the basis of some
unique characteristic of commercial speech without impairing the
principle of content neutrality?"' He answered that commercial
speech possesses a unique characteristic, the "contractual function of
the language," that distinguishes it from other speech." At its core,
Farber's approach is an expansive notion of fraud.
Eugene Volokh also implicitly argues that commercial speech
regulation might be best understood as just a species of fraud.
Farber may be right that fraud can be expanded to reduce the
requirement of showing proximate cause without violating the due
process clause of the constitution. Perhaps it is sufficient to regulate
the truth content of advertising to allow an action for fraud with
presumptive rather than actual reliance.
These, however, are the easy cases. Much harder cases are posed
by the fading boundary between advertisement and other forms of
commercial speech. For example, in Kasky, the California Supreme
Court considered efforts by Nike, Inc. to defend its overseas labor
practices in press releases, in letters to newspapers, in a letter to
university presidents and athletic directors, and in other documents
105. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 N.W.U. L.
REV. 372, 375 (1979).
106. Id. at 387.
107. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1081-83 (2000).
108. At least one court may be headed in this direction, as described by David
Dickinson, An Architecture for Spam Regulation, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 129, 141 (2004)
(discussing Mainstream Marketing Services v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2004), where
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Do-Not-Call
Registry. The Tenth Circuit found that the distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech appeared to be reasonable because commercial solicitations are more
likely to result in fraud, and have done more to invade individual privacy than non-
commercial solicitations.).
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distributed for public relations purposes.'" Nike also bought full-page
spaces in leading newspapers to publicize a report that GoodWorks
International, LLC, had prepared under a contract with Nike."o The
report was based on an investigation by a former United States
Ambassador, and it stated that it found no evidence of illegal or
unsafe working conditions at Nike factories."' The California
Supreme Court found these to be commercial speech, reversing the
lower courts who found otherwise. 2
As Justice Chin noted in dissent, "With the growth of
commercialism, the politicization of commercial interests, and the
increasing sophistication of commercial advertising over the past
century, the gap between commercial and noncommercial speech is
rapidly shrinking.""' Certainly, Farber would have had a hard time
applying his "contractual nature" argument to reach this result, given
the attenuation between assertions about Nike labor practices abroad
and the offering of sneakers for sale at the local Foot Locker.
Moreover, it was troubling to some that the same words, if spoken by
someone other than Nike, would have been obviously protected
under the First Amendment."4 To the extent that Kasky relied on the
identity of the speaker to determine the constitutional treatment of
the message, its holding is suspect if the identity of the speaker is not
a proper basis for regulation. In sum, the classic rationales for
commercial speech doctrine are not compelling today.
B. The Failure to Find a Definition for Commercial Speech
Does the category "commercial speech" have any workable
definition? If the identity of the speaker is not a sufficient basis to
disfavor commercial speech under the First Amendment, the
definition must be related to the commercial content. In fact, the
standard definitions adopted by courts do concern the content of the
speech. "Commercial speech" has been defined as speech that
109. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal. 4th 939, 947-49 (2002).
110. Id.
111. Id. Because the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the case became a cause
c6l6bre in First Amendment circles known by its federal nomenclature as Nike v. Kasky.
The Supreme Court later dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003).
112. Kasky, 27 Cal. 4th at 970.
113. Id. at 979 (2002) (Chin, J., dissenting).
114. See, e.g., Terilli, supra note 21, at 385 ("In this legal marshland, the commercial
speech doctrine has become a linguistic quagmire for speakers with commercial interests
and for speech that may or may not be deemed commercial.").
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[merely] "proposes a commercial transaction" or (Central Hudson)
speech that is "related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and [the] audience."... The Supreme Court's broadest definition for
commercial speech is an "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience."..
The Central Hudson Court stated:
In most other contexts, the First Amendment prohibits
regulation based on the content of the message. Two features
of commercial speech permit regulation of its content. First,
commercial speakers have extensive knowledge of both the
market and their products. Thus, they are well situated to
evaluate the accuracy of their messages and the lawfulness of
the underlying activity. In addition, commercial speech, the
offspring of economic self-interest, is a hardy breed of
expression that is not "particularly susceptible to being crushed
by overbroad regulation."'
The biggest flaw with the aforementioned definitions is that they
do not delimit the scope of commercial speech doctrine. For
example, the speech in Kasky did not "solely" relate to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience. In discussing child labor
and other working conditions overseas, the speech at issue plainly
touched on other issues, even if it could be described as primarily
about promoting Nike's products. Similarly, commercial speech
doctrine covers plenty of messages that do not propose a commercial
transaction, such as the "Happy Cows Come from California"
advertisements and other feel-good industry advertisements that
arguably function almost as public service announcements.
Another way of looking at the problem is to ask whether we
could change the title of "commercial speech" to simply "commercial
advertisements." This would not square with the sweep of Central
Hudson (and would invite battles over the meaning of the term
"advertisement"). The phrase "commercial speech" was probably
intended to stave off terminological disputes over what constitutes an
115. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 562 (1980).
116. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993).
117. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 n.6 (citations omitted).
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advertisement, but it has not solved the definitional problem that is
central, in the end, to due process."'
Sometimes, courts seem almost to reason backwards, recognizing
that speech should be regulated as commercial speech not by its own
content, but by its legislative treatment."' The most obvious
difference between commercial and noncommercial speech is that we
permit regulation that bans "false" commercial speech.120 Many
courts begin their analysis of commercial speech by noting that it
must be fundamentally different because we allow regulation of
"false" commercial speech.
When it came to Central Hudson, Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, began with the observation that "[O]ur decisions have
recognized "the 'commonsense' distinction between speech proposing
a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally
subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech." 2'
The term "commonsense" carries with it little or no analytical rigor.
Others have tried to define commercial speech as that which
causes particular harms.'22 Circular arguments such as these always
have more to recommend them in legal practice than most legal
scholars would like to admit, of course, because it is injury that brings
cases to court. Still, to define commercial speech as that speech which
that produces the harms complained of in Central Hudson has just
one problem: It does not reflect the state of the law. Indeed, new
questions keep arising that have nothing to do with harm. When is a
weblog commercial speech?'2 Is the Supreme Court really going to
decide that an advertising-supported newspaper is not a commercial
enterprise essentially beholden to its advertisers while a blog is?
Does it matter how much the sponsor insinuates itself into the
content?
Is commercial speech about money? Unfortunately, any
discussion about commercial speech must eventually mention Dr.
Johnson's remark that "No man but a blockhead ever wrote, except
118. Note that the 1942 Supreme Court case that first decided commercial speech was
entirely outside the First Amendment referred to it as "commercial advertising," while the
term "commercial speech" was not used. See generally Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S.
52 (1942).
119. See, e.g., Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of New York, 608 F. Supp. 2d 477,
513-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
120. Chemerinsky & Fisk, supra note 92, at 1160.
121. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563.
122. Fischette, supra note 8, at 709.
123. Anthony Ciolli, Are Blogs Commercial Speech?, 58 S.C. L. REv. 725 (2007).
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for money."1 24  Certainly, the fact that most newspapers and
magazines are for-profit publications does nothing to diminish their
First Amendment protection for them or for the authors whose works
are published by them. Similarly, courts hold that "that speech that
solicits funds is protected by the First Amendment."' Obviously,
then, we must note the curious fact that the test for whether speech is
''commercial" is not whether the speaker intended to profit from the
speech. Thus, the attempt to define "commercial speech" by
reference to some neutral principle remains elusive.
In a larger sense, however, the definitional problem is the result
of the shift away from the category/values based approach to the First
Amendment. What the Central Hudson Court described as a
"commonsense" distinction was little more than inscribing its values
into the First Amendment; commercial speech was treated differently
because it is of lower value than political speech, and it was thus
defined by its lack of relation to valued political or cultural subjects.26
When Justice Potter made a similar famous comment about
obscenity-"I know it when I see it"-he was being honest rather
than just flippant.127 When a definition is based on values rather than
objective principles, determining the fit within the category is a
matter of values-based judging. When we reject that sort of judging,
we find that we no longer understand the category. That is what has
happened throughout First Amendment law.
Now that the public-purpose vision of the First Amendment and
its embedded values have been written out of our free speech law, the
"commercial speech" category is unmoored from its original
justification and the definition of the category seems arbitrary or
circular; it is simply that speech which is subject to the Central
Hudson test.
124. THE SAMUEL JOHNSON SOUND BITE PAGE, available at
www.samueljohnson.com/writing.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010). The esteemed Dr.
Johnson had evidently not heard of a law review.
125. Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992); Vill. of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 628-32 (1980)).
126. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64 (defining commercial speech by its
relationship to the informational content of advertising).
127. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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III. Citizens United and the End of Connercial Speech
Doctrine
A. Citizens United and the Marketplace Metaphor
Citizens United holds that corporate political speech may not be
disfavored merely because it its authors are corporate."" It applied
strict scrutiny to the campaign spending regulations at issue (it also
equated spending with "speech").'29 There has been a good deal of
discussion about Citizens United in the press, including the President's
own attack on the decision with the court sitting in front of him (a
confrontation out of the dream book of every appellate lawyer).
The reasoning of the decision tells us that the Court is rejecting
even the more modern revisions of the public-purpose view of the
First Amendment, taking both the marketplace metaphor and its
requirement of noninterference to a terminal stage of development.
These two paragraphs from Justice Kennedy's opinion are telling:
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First
Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects
or viewpoints. (citations omitted) Prohibited, too, are
restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing
speech by some but not others. (citations omitted) As
instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often
simply a means to control content.
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content,
moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong
when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers. By taking
the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the
Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and
respect for the speaker's voice. The Government may not by
these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and
speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.130
128. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 883 (2010).
129. Id. (citing United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 813
(2000); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 784 (1978)).
130. Id. at 884.
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As explored above, the notion that the First Amendment is
"premised on mistrust of governmental power" is not a neutral or
historically objective observation. That prominence of the "mistrust"
idea derives from the noninterference mandate of the "marketplace
of ideas." And that is how Citizens United puts it, in overruling the
Austin decision, "Austin interferes with the 'open marketplace' of
ideas protected by the First Amendment."1 31
In his concurrence in Citizens United, Chief Justice Roberts
warned that the enforcement of limits on corporations just because
they are corporations would cause great harm in that "First
Amendment rights could be confined to individuals, subverting the
vibrant public discourse that is at the foundation of our democracy." 13 2
The phrase "confined to individuals" is stunning: Evidently, Chief
Justice Roberts would read the First Amendment entirely as a
limitation on government, largely repudiating it as an expression of
human rights. The majority of the Court has not gone so far,
however.
The Citizens United majority also indulges the historical fiction
that accompanies the "marketplace" metaphor. Justice Kennedy
writes that "[a]t the founding, speech was open, comprehensive, and
vital to society's definition of itself; there were no limits on the
sources of speech and knowledge."'33 But the First Amendment was
adopted at a time when blasphemy was illegal in every state, and
prohibitions against other forms of undesirable speech, such as
pornography or other lewd material, were entirely unprotected. If
speech was "open" in 1789, this denotes a very limited sort of
openness. By recasting the history of the First Amendment as one of
openness, Citizens United truly forecloses the public purpose
understanding of the amendment. Indeed, this passage may not be so
much unhistorical as ahistorical, positing a "founding" almost out of
time and space like Locke's state of nature.13
In addition, the repeated use of the term "open" to describe the
historical status of free speech suggests the Court's mindset to view
regulations of any kind as closing off some portion of the idea or
speech "market." It also suggests a natural emptiness, like a
fairground when there is no fair taking place, or a sort of tabula rasa
131. Id. at 921 (Roberts, C. J., concurring) (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
132. Id. at 917.
133. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 906.
134. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1689).
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on which ideas are spread for sale. This is not a necessary
interpretation of the market metaphor, but clearly the dominant one
today. Market regulations, however, can be viewed in other ways, as
enabling or opening a market that is naturally "closed"-as many
markets have been over time.
In ruling that corporate political speech (spending money)
cannot be regulated differently from individual political speech,
Citizens United knocked down two main arguments that could
support commercial speech doctrine. First, confining the holding in
Citizens United to political speech would reestablish the very values-
based categories that the "marketplace" metaphor and the modern
Court eschews. We should expect the extension of Citizens United to
all forms of speech in which corporations participate, granting
corporations equal rights with natural persons. Thus, it will become
impossible to justify lower protection for commercial speech merely
because it might be speech by a corporation. This means that any
justification for commercial speech doctrine must derive from some
objectively measurable negative aspect of the commercial content of
the speech. Such change will be sweeping, and the Court's very broad
language was noted by dissenters, who argued-correctly from
history-that "it is simply incorrect to suggest that we have prohibited
all legislative distinctions based on identity or content. Not even
close.""'
Second, Citizens United held that the government has no
cognizable interest in fixing "market distortion" in the "marketplace
of ideas.",1 6 That the idea marketplace is self-regulating, or at least
ultimately self-correcting, is assumed. Put another way, the ability of
the marketplace of ideas to support and sustain democratic self-
government is presumed to be organic. We must now ask with
Ronald Coase, if we trust truth to win out in the marketplace of ideas
(political speech), why do we not similarly expect truth to win out in
the marketplace of goods (commercial speech)? Inevitably, courts
must respond to these forces by restricting the "false advertising"
doctrine towards the neighborhood of traditional fraudulent
representations, leaving aside all manner of puffery or debatable
opinion.
In other words, the Supreme Court will have to consider whether
it can continue to maintain a purely categorical approach to
commercial speech without the embedded values that supported it.
135. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 946 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 904-07 (majority opinion).
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We can, I believe, safely expect the "marketplace" metaphor to
expand from the political realm back to the marketplace.'
Likely, Martin Redish's predictions will prove prescient. Redish
wrote in 2007:
[T]o all too great an extent, all three forms of criticism of
commercial speech suffer from the same fundamental flaw: each
either constitutes, facilitates, or, at the very least, comes
dangerously close to a constitutionally destructive form of
viewpoint-based regulation. As such, each gives rise, ironically
in the name of the First Amendment, to the most universally
condemned threat to the foundations of free expression-
suppression based on the regulators' subjective disagreement.1
He argued that commercial speech would ultimately come to be
seen as forbidden viewpoint discrimination. Citizens United points us
squarely down that path.
Thus, we have seen that Citizens United is not a radical departure
from the current direction of the Supreme Court, but is an extension
of the "marketplace metaphor" that has come to dominate First
Amendment cases over the past few decades. In that sense, Citizens
137. In this light, the endorsement of disclosure requirements for corporate "speakers"
(donors) is in line with a view of the efficient market having information.
It is worth noting that Justice Thomas did not join the majority opinion when it came to
disclosures. So Justice Thomas rejected disclosure requirements entirely, citing the
pressure put on opponents of same-sex marriage in California by those in favor, in
particular the economic boycott of a restaurant ("And a woman who had managed her
popular, family-owned restaurant for 26 years was forced to resign after she gave $100,
because 'throngs of [angry] protesters' repeatedly arrived at the restaurant and 'shout[ed]
"shame on you" at customers."' Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 981 (Thomas, J.,
concurring)). Justice Thomas would not explicitly bar the protestors, but he would
deprive the protestors of the information they need to protest-the information about
who was donating to the opposing cause. Thus, Justice Thomas is not really behind the
notion that government may not structure rules to redress imbalances in the "marketplace
of ideas"-he just has different ideas of what the rules should be.
Of course, once we equate spending money with speech, the question of disclosure should
be straightforward. If even corporate campaign donations are speech, what sense does it
make for the speakers to seek to keep their "speech" a secret? Was not the woman who
donated $100 speaking? If so, how do we understand a right not to be heard? If speaking
is about expression or communication, it is clear that the interest in anonymous, secret
donations is not about speech at all.
There is a definite political bent to Citizens United that I am obscuring in this article to
poke at the metaphors that underlie the majority view. Nonetheless, I do not dismiss in
any way the criticism that the decision was intended by some of its participants, despite its
ultimate libertarian expression, to skew public debate in a particular direction.
138. Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the
Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67,69 (2007).
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United is probably more problematic from a policy perspective than
from a philosophical or doctrinal point of view. Citizens United
removes campaign finance rules that are incompatible with the
direction the "marketplace metaphor" was going to take the Court.
In doing so, it breathed a sense of intellectual honesty into an area of
speech regulation that needed it, particularly following the
incomprehensible 2003 decision in McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission.'39
B. Abolishing Commercial Speech Doctrine Will Restore Integrity to
the First Amendment
"Here's the big deal. This is the way Constitutional rights are
lost. Not in the thunder of a tyrant's edict, but in the soft judicial
whispers of deference.""4
The Citizens United decision should finally break the back of
commercial speech doctrine, which will be a reason to rejoice. The
Central Hudson Court understood some of the practical realities of
extending First Amendment protection to commercial speech. It
confronted a history of substantial regulation of commercial speech,
much of it in reaction to unwanted billboard advertising,14' and feared
what would happen if it were swept away with the stroke of a pen.
Rather than find a way to contain restrictions on advertising within a
First Amendment framework, the Central Hudson Court preferred to
retain existing rules and sweep them into a safe constitutional
category.
The Central Hudson Court also, correctly, feared that the failure
to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech could
lead to the same kinds of regulations being adopted for
noncommercial speech that are permissible for commercial speech.142
As a result, it sought to categorize and wall off commercial speech
from full First Amendment protection even while acknowledging that
it was "speech," and as such entitled to some protection.
This was the wrong solution to a real problem, with unfortunate
side effects. Vincent Blasi argues that the First Amendment should
139. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
140. Vo v. City of Garden Grove, 115 Cal. App. 4th 425, 460 (Ct. App. 2004) (Sills, J.,
dissenting).
141. See generally Darrel Menthe, Aesthetic Regulation and the Development of First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 221 (2010).
142. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S.
557, 563 (1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1978)).
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be equipped for the "worst of times" when the government is likely to
stifle dissent systematically.43 He posits that the First Amendment is
always under threat and needs to be defended, perhaps by
extraordinary measures.'" Blasi self-deprecatingly refers to this as
the "pathological approach" to the First Amendment.'45 This view, if
it has merit, suggests that the First Amendment is uniquely
vulnerable to the diffusion of pernicious doctrines.
With respect to commercial speech, Blasi argued that by asking
judges to routinely assess the potential of commercial speech to
mislead, modern commercial speech doctrine weakens the taboo
against evaluation of the truth of unpopular political expression."
The fear was that an "exception" for commercial speech would, in
effect, spread to lower protection for other areas of speech:
Again, the exception to this principle could be confined to the
realm of commercial speech; there are some features of
commercial speech that distinguish it from all other types of
communication. But a court operating in pathological times that
views the dangers generated by an unpopular speaker's message
as "substantial" and "disproportionate" to the value of the
message might be sorely tempted to carve out a second
exception to the principle against message balancing.47
He is not hostile to commercial speech doctrine, urging as a
practical matter that the "middle-of-the-road" approach be used
rather than use the First Amendment simply to bar the popular policy
goals of controlling advertising.148
In making this suggestion, Blasi's work is a mirror of the
somewhat different fear expressed in Central Hudson that if
commercial speech were accorded full protection, the natural
inclination of courts to regulate commercial speech more heavily
would invite dilution of First Amendment protections for political
speech.
While Blasi's "pathological approach" may have its critics, its
assumption of political hostility makes it a useful approach where
such hostility is manifest. Moreover, in the twenty-five years since
143. Blasi, supra note 19, at 486-88.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 484-85.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 486.
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Blasi first made these suggestions, the fear of harm has proven to
prophetic, but it has come from Central Hudson itself, which has
turned out to be the very "exception" he feared, not much of a
"middle-of-the-road" approach at all.
Between both advertising regulations and zoning regulations,
Central Hudson has allowed the elaboration of intricate sign codes
across the United States, regulating signage and aesthetic expression
in almost awesome detail.
A good example of a highly detailed sign ordinance addressed by
the Supreme Court is the 1994 case of City of LaDue v. Gilleo where
a homeowner was prosecuted by the city of LaDue, Missouri, for
erecting a sign at her home that read "For Peace in the Gulf."149
Under any other form of analysis, we would have regarded
sections 35-2 and 35-3 of the ordinance, under which the suit was
brought, a formal prior restraint: "No sign shall be erected [or]
maintained" in the City except in conformity with the ordinance and
further authorized the City to remove nonconforming signs.so
More importantly was the detail of the ordinance. Section 35-1
of the LaDue ordinance defined "sign" as:
A name, word, letter, writing, identification, description, or
illustration which is erected, placed upon, affixed to, painted or
represented upon a building or structure, or any part thereof, or
in any manner upon a parcel of land or lot, and which publicizes
an object, product, place, activity, opinion, person, institution,
organization or place of business, or which is used to advertise
or promote the interests of any person. The word "sign" shall
also include "banners", "pennants", "insignia", "bulletin
boards", "ground signs", "billboard", "poster billboards",
"illuminated signs", "projecting signs", "temporary signs",
"marquees", "roof signs", "yard signs", "electric signs", "wall
signs", and "window signs", [sic] wherever placed out of doors
in view of the general public or wherever placed indoors as a
* * 151
window sign.
The rule then had a series of equally picayune exceptions. As
the LaDue Court put it, "The full catalog of exceptions, each subject
to special size limitations, is as follows: "[M]unicipal signs";
"Islubdivision and residence identification" signs; "[r]oad signs and
driveway signs for danger, direction, or identification"; "[h]ealth
149. City of LaDue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43,45 (1994).
150. Id. at 43 n.5 (citations omitted).
151. Id.
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inspection signs"; "[s]igns for churches, religious institutions, and
schools" (subject to regulations set forth in § 35-5); "identification
signs" for other not-for-profit organizations; signs "identifying the
location of public transportation stops"; "[g]round signs advertising
the sale or rental of real property," subject to the conditions, set forth
in § 35-10, that such signs may "not be attached to any tree, fence or
utility pole" and may contain only the fact of proposed sale or rental
and the seller or agent's name and address or telephone number;
"[c]ommercial signs in commercially zoned or industrial zoned
districts," subject to restrictions set out elsewhere in the ordinance;
and signs that "identif[y] safety hazards." 15 2 It is notable that almost
all of these regulatory categories are arguably content based.
This is not an exceptional ordinance, although it is one of few
that has had an airing in the high Court. Detailed sign codes such as
this occur across the country. Los Angeles, for example, has separate
regulations for the following types of signs: Identification Sign,
Illuminated Architectural Canopy Sign, Information Sign, Monument
Sign, Mural Sign, On-Site Signs, Off-Site Signs, "Time and
Temperature" signs, Supergraphic Sign, Temporary Sign, Wall Sign,
and Window Signs.'
The First Amendment concern arises from the elaborate nature
of what is forbidden or permitted, as well as the frequent use of
content in definitions. Taken individually, each might pass the
Central Hudson test, each regulation related to some governmental
interest. Taken together, they become complete schemes thoroughly
regulating almost all expression through the medium of signage
through prior permitting requirements.
The Court in LaDue confronted a scenario that many of us today
consider unimaginable-barring a private person from putting a small
political sign at her house. But it happened. The elaborate nature of
the sign ordinance there, I suggest, is not a coincidence. Worse, these
elaborate ordinances encourage deference by the judiciary because
they smack of expertise.""
Finally, the pernicious effect of such rules has to be understood
with their promulgation, hand-in-hand, with zoning regulations.
Although some rules are upheld merely as content neutral "time,
152. Id. at 43 n.6 (citation omitted).
153. Los ANGELES, CAL., MUN. CODE ch. 1, art. 4.4 (2009) (sign regulation).
154. For a description of how perceived expertise can lead to deference, see generally
Robert F. Bauer, When "The Pols Make the Calls": McConnell's Theory of Judicial
Deference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 5 (2004).
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place, and manner" regulations rather than under Central Hudson,
the practical effect is a low level of scrutiny.
The result of such detailed regulation of expression in private
and public space is an erosion of right of political expression in the
public square. There is a direct practical line that can be drawn from
these elaborate sign codes and zoning rules to the "free speech zones"
that now severely curtail the right of free expression during major
international events. The free speech zones take the "bubble" rules
of Hill"' and turn them inside out. We are all too accustomed to a
regime of prior permits and restrictions for speech, to ensure that
business is free of disruption.
Conclusion
As much as Citizens United may seem to some to be purely about
enhancing corporate power, it does promise to create some a
doctrinal consistency in an area that badly needs it. This author
believes that a robust First Amendment, even if so established in the
first instance for the benefit of large corporations, is better off than if
allowed to degenerate into a rule riddled with exceptions. Yes, the
"marketplace" metaphor may lead us to places we do not wish to go,
but it also has the ability to put the First Amendment on a surer
footing than it has been while merely between metaphors.
The reason for concern is contained in the premise underlying
the "pathological perspective." The problem free speech advocates
face is that the First Amendment is generally held to protect more
speech than the democratic majority would normally allow, and the
success of the First Amendment in protecting the less popular aspects
of its reach depends on the willingness of courts and democratic
majorities to respect the whole framework of the First Amendment,
taking the sweet with the bitter, the noble and the profane together.
This role of the greatly enhanced if the First Amendment is treated
by Courts as an almost "sacred" principle. It is worth noting that
both the public-purpose vision and the "marketplace" vision place an
extreme importance on the First Amendment.
We do not need a special regime for commercial speech. There
are ways to save most sign regulations and truth-in-advertising laws.
The latter must be tied more closely to fraud protection. In a case
where corporations or other individuals tell falsehoods about their
business practices, the proper plaintiffs will be those who can
155. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
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demonstrate some reliance on those statements. Sign regulation will
have to be directed more closely to the size, shape, configuration, and
quantity of signs, without regard to commercial content.
Accordingly, the First Amendment is sounder and safer if
premised on some principle that is consistently respected and applied,
so that is available for use when the least hardy sort of speech is
under threat. Citizens United, with its determined application of the
marketplace metaphor, signals a desire and willingness to take the
marketplace metaphor to its logical conclusions and embed these
deep within the First Amendment. It should lead to the abolition of
commercial speech doctrine, ending the "somewhat" protection for
commercial speech, as the California Supreme Court dubbed earlier
this century. This process will, I believe, actually shore up the First
Amendment for years to come.
168 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 38:1
